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Multiple Outbreaks of African Swine Fever Reported in China

Report Categories:

Livestock and Products

Approved By:

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
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Report Highlights:

China reported a second and third outbreak of African Swine Fever, this time in the heart of China's pig producing area. The second outbreak was identified on August 14, involving 30 dead pigs in a slaughterhouse in Zhengzhou City, Henan Province. The diseased pigs were traced back to a farm 1,500 miles away in Jiamusi City, Heilongjiang Province. China reported this event to the World Animal Health Organization (OIE) on August 16 and has quarantined the slaughterhouse and is carrying out surveillance activities in Heilongjiang Province. The third outbreak was reported on August 19, on a farm in Lianyungang City, Jiangsu Province, involving 88 dead pigs. More information about this late-breaking outbreak will be forthcoming. These outbreaks follow on the heels of an August 1 outbreak in Shenyang City, Liaoning Province where 47 pigs died from African Swine Fever.

Incident Background



Key:

PROVINCES

Cities

(Red) = Provinces with confirmed cases

(Yellow) = Provinces with ongoing investigations

The first outbreak: Shenyang City, Liaoning Province

On August 1, 2018, Liaoning provincial officials and Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Affairs (MARA) officials detected one outbreak of the disease African Swine Fever (ASF). The samples were sent to an advanced diagnostics lab at the China Animal Health Epidemiology Center (CAHE) and positively confirmed as ASF. On August 3, MARA's Chief Veterinary Officer filed a report with the World Animal Health Organization (OIE) reporting the outbreak.

In the August 3rd OIE report ([link here](#)), China reported the following: there was 1 outbreak, with 47 confirmed cases of ASF and all infected pigs died from the disease). Another 8069 pigs were considered susceptible and were disposed of by government agents. The OIE report stated that the local government had launched the African Swine Fever Contingency Plan and had designated this as an Emergency Response Level II incident. An unofficial translation of this plan is attached below.

On August 4, MARA filed another report with the OIE ([link here](#)), reporting the following: an "epidemic zone" was designated, extending 3 km beyond the outbreak site. Entrance and exit from the

outbreak zone and epidemic zone was restricted and must be accompanied by disinfection. At the time of the report, China reported that 1.88 million live pigs had been screened in the Liaoning Province and there were no new cases detected.

On August 16, MARA filed its third OIE follow-up report, stating that there had been no new outbreaks ([link here](#)). The report further noted that out over 35.54 million pigs had been screened, 10,226 samples were taken, and 7 samples tested positive for ASF. All of the positive samples came from two villages in the threatened area and all 676 pigs in those villages were disposed of by government officials.

The second outbreak: Zhengzhou City, Henan Province

On August 14, 2018, a slaughterhouse in Zhengzhou reported that 30 pigs at its facility had died from ASF and another 30 exhibited signs of the disease. Local and central government officials took samples and analyzed them at CAHEC. Early on August 16, CAHEC confirmed the presence of ASF. Late in the day, MARA made a public announcement ([original Chinese announcement here](#)) stating that there had been another outbreak, but at present, the “epidemic has been effectively controlled.” The MARA announcement stated that the diseased pigs had come from a farm in Jiamusi City, Heilongjiang Province, roughly 1,500 miles away.

On August 16, MARA filed a report with the OIE ([link here](#)). MARA reported this outbreak as the first occurrence of a listed disease and did not link it to the earlier outbreak in Shenyang. In addition, MARA noted that the source of the outbreak in Zhengzhou was due to the legal movement of animals from Jiamusi City in Heilongjiang Province.

On August 17, Chinese media reported that the farm in Jiamusi where the diseased pigs originated from had purchased the piglets from neighboring Jilin Province ([original link to Chinese article here](#)). Multiple Chinese media outlets reported that the Jilin piglet operation had noticed unexplained pig deaths, but still sold animals it suspected were ill. Furthermore, this same piglet operation also sold an undetermined number of piglets to other farms at the same time. According to Chinese media, a number of personnel from this operation have already been taken into custody for violating animal health regulations.

The third outbreak: Lianyungang City, Jiangsu Province

On August 19, 2018, MARA announced another outbreak of ASF, this time on a farm in Lianyungang City, Jiangsu Province ([original Chinese announcement here](#)). The report stated that as early as August 15, there were reports of unexplained pig deaths. In total 88 pigs had died from disease and another 615 were sick. As of August 20, 2018 local time, MARA had not yet reported this third outbreak to the OIE.

Impact


ASF is a highly contagious disease in swine (including domestic swine and wild hogs) that must be reported to OIE ([link to the OIE ASF fact sheet](#)). There is no vaccine and no treatment. Once a

domesticated pig is infected, it usually experiences death within 2-10 days. Since China is the largest swine producer and pork consumer in the world, a major ASF outbreak can have a significant impact on China's food security and trade.

The second and third outbreaks are located in the heart of China's pig production

These second and third outbreaks, centered in Henan and Jiangsu Provinces, represent a significant escalation of the outbreak situation. Unlike Liaoning Province, which only accounts for 3 percent of total swine production, Henan and Jiangsu Provinces account for over 10 percent and 4 percent of production, respectively. Moreover, these provinces are bordered by Hebei, Shandong, Anhui, and Hubei Provinces—accounting for another 19 percent.

Outbreaks vs. Concentration of Pig Production (in 2016)



Brown = 10 to 20 percent (Sichuan, HeNan)

Orange = 5 to 10 percent (Shandong, Hubei, HuNan, Guangdong, Guangxi, YunNan)

Yellow = 3 to 5 percent (HeiLongJiang, LiaoNing, JiangSu, AnHui, JiangXi, GuiZhou)

The source of the second outbreak was in Heilongjiang Province, 1500 miles away down a heavily traveled pig transportation corridor

The slaughterhouse in Henan Province is located roughly 1,500 miles away from the originating farm in Heilongjiang Province. This distance represents a 30-hour trip by truck that is heavily traveled by trucks moving pigs from Northeast China to Central China.

In a risk assessment published in March 2018, FAO experts warned that transport-associated routes were the most likely pathways of ASF introduction into China, followed by the illegal imports of food and by Chinese workers working abroad ([link to FAO Report here](#)). The report also targeted Heilongjiang Province as the most likely location for an ASF outbreak in China.

The stock prices of China's largest pork producers have dropped sharply since the second outbreak

Henan Shuanghui Investment and Development, a subsidiary of WH Group, owns and operates the now-quarantined slaughterhouse in Zhengzhou. (Note, WH Group acquired US-based Smithfield Foods back in 2013.) From the time its slaughterhouse was implicated on August 16 to the opening of business on August 20, Shuanghui's stock dropped 13 percent. Muyuan Foods Co. Ltd., another large producer, saw its share price drop 16 percent from August 16 to August 20. Guangdong Wens Foodstuff Group Co. Ltd. saw its share price start to drop on August 16 and by August 20, it had lost over 10 percent.

Attachment 1 – Unofficial Translation of the African Swine Fever Contingency Plan and Emergency Response Level II

African Swine Fever Contingency Plan

1 General

African swine fever is an acute, heat, and highly contagious zoonotic disease caused by the African swine fever virus. The World Organisation for Animal Health (OIE) listed it as a statutory report on animal diseases. China listed it as A class of animal diseases, and it is one of the key exotic animal diseases that China is focusing on.

1.1 Purpose of preparation

Timely fight against the outbreak of African swine fever and ensure the healthy development of the pig breeding industry.

1.2 Basis for preparation

According to the "People's Republic of China Animal Epidemic Prevention Law", "People's Republic of China Entry and Exit Animal and Plant Quarantine Law", "Important Animal Disease Epidemic Emergency Regulations", "National Sudden Major Animal Epidemic Emergency Plan" and "National Medium- and Long-Term Animal Disease Prevention and Control Plan (2012-2020) Year), develop this plan.

1.3 Working principles

In accordance with the principle of territorial management, the government will be responsible for unified leadership and division of labor, and the implementation of the responsibility system for prevention and control, and joint prevention and control, and the formation of prevention and control.

Adhere to prevention and implement the prevention and control policy of “strengthening leadership, closely cooperating, relying on science, prevention by law, group prevention and control, and decisive disposal”. According to the requirements of “early, fast, strict, and small”, early detection, rapid response, strict treatment, and reduction of losses.

1.4 Scope of application

This plan is applicable to the emergency disposal of sudden African pig swine outbreaks in China.

2 Organization Management

2.1 Emergency command organization

Under the unified leadership of the State Council, the Ministry of Agriculture is responsible for organizing and coordinating the emergency management of the African swine fever epidemic in the country, and according to the needs of emergency response work, the State Council is proposed to initiate emergency response of the State Council's major animal epidemic emergency headquarters.

Under the unified leadership of the people's government at the same level, the local veterinary departments of local people's governments shall be responsible for organizing and coordinating the emergency management of the African swine fever epidemic in their respective administrative areas, and proposing the people's government at the same level to start the recommendations for major animal epidemic emergency headquarters response according to the need for emergency response to the emergency situation.

The emergency headquarters of the people's governments at all levels shall clearly form the departments, and all relevant departments shall strengthen coordination and cooperation, and establish and improve a joint prevention and control coordination mechanism involving multiple departments.

2.2 Division of responsibilities

The Ministry of Agriculture is responsible for organizing the implementation of emergency management of sudden African swine fever epidemics, and conducting inspections and supervision; timely publishing information on the outbreak of African swine fever, and reporting the epidemic situation to relevant international organizations, countries and regions; emergency organization to allocate disinfection drugs and other emergency Anti-epidemic materials; suggestions for starting and stopping emergency control measures for the epidemic; organization of assessments of culling and compensation costs and epidemic losses. All local veterinary departments should actively cooperate with relevant departments such as entry-exit inspection and quarantine, do a good job in preventing the risk of introduction of African swine fever, promptly carry out emergency treatment of sudden epidemics, and effectively implement

epidemic surveillance, epidemiological investigation, investigation and disinfection. Comprehensive prevention and control measures such as quarantine supervision and culling. The veterinary department in the border area should focus on strengthening prevention and control in the border areas, adhere to internal prevention and external blocking, and cooperate with relevant departments to effectively implement prevention and control measures such as border inspection and disinfection.

The veterinary department should actively coordinate the relevant departments of entry-exit inspection and quarantine, customs, forestry, etc., in accordance with the division of responsibilities of various departments, to do a good job in the emergency treatment of African swine fever. The military and armed police forces participated in the emergency response to the sudden occurrence of the African swine fever epidemic according to laws.

3 Epidemic monitoring and reporting

3.1 International Epidemic Surveillance

The China Center for Animal Health and Epidemiology should closely monitor the international epidemic situation of African swine fever, scientifically assess the risk of introduction of African swine fever into China, and promptly propose relevant measures.

The border areas, especially those bordering the epidemic countries, as well as the veterinary departments at the highway ports, railway ports, international airports and seaports, should actively coordinate relevant departments such as entry-exit inspection and quarantine, forestry, etc., and closely monitor the health status of domestic pigs and wild boars.

3.2 Epidemic monitoring

The China Animal Disease Prevention and Control Center, the China Animal Health and Epidemiology Center, local animal disease prevention and control institutions and other relevant units must closely cooperate to do a good job in monitoring African pigs.

3.3 Epidemic report and confirmation

Any unit or individual who reports the death of a pig with unknown causes or the abnormal death of a wild boar shall report to the local veterinary department in a timely manner. After receiving reports of suspicious epidemics, the veterinary departments at all levels shall report to the Veterinary Bureau of the Ministry of Agriculture and the China Animal Disease Prevention and Control Center in accordance with the requirements of the National Animal Epidemic Report. The local animal epidemic prevention and control institutions at or above the county level shall collect samples according to the requirements of the prevention and control technical specifications and send them to the provincial animal epidemic prevention and control institutions for testing. If the suspected African swine fever is detected, they will be immediately sent to the China Animal Health and Epidemiology Center for diagnosis. Based on the results of the diagnosis, the Ministry of Agriculture identified and released the African swine fever epidemic.

4 Epidemic response

4.1 Classification of the epidemic

According to the nature, harm degree and scope of the African swine fever epidemic situation, the African swine fever epidemic situation is divided into three levels: Extraordinary (I level) epidemic situation, major (level II) epidemic situation and large (level III) epidemic situation.

4.1.1 Extraordinary (Class I) Epidemic

Within 15 days, more than 2 (including) provincial administrative districts were affected by the epidemic.

4.1.2 Major (Level II) epidemic

Within 15 days, an outbreak occurred in more than one (including) county-level administrative regions in one provincial administrative region.

4.1.3 Large (Level III) Epidemic

African swine fever virus was detected in pigs imported from road ports, railway ports and ports (airports, seaports).

4.1.4 When the African swine fever epidemic is first introduced into China and other unexpected epidemics, it is determined by the Ministry of Agriculture according to the actual situation.

4.2 Graded response

In the event of an African swine fever epidemic, an emergency response is made in accordance with the principles of territorial management and grading response. All relevant departments shall, according to the procedures, start the “National Emergency Plan for Major Animal Epidemics” and this plan, and adjust the response level in time according to the results of the epidemic situation and risk analysis.

4.2.1 Extraordinary (Class I) Epidemic Response

The Ministry of Agriculture issued a Class I outbreak warning to the society. The country immediately launched the African swine fever prevention and control working day daily reporting system. In the event of an outbreak, the province suspends the transfer of its live pigs and related products across the province, and suspends live pigs and related products from the county where the epidemic occurred. Conduct emergency epidemiological investigations and investigations nationwide.

All relevant departments shall, in accordance with the division of responsibilities, work together to prevent and control the African swine fever.

4.2.2 Major (Level II) Epidemic Response

The Ministry of Agriculture issued a Class II outbreak warning to the society. The province-level veterinary department of the outbreak province immediately launched the African swine fever prevention and control working day daily reporting system, and suspend the hog and related products from the affected county. Relevant provinces carry out emergency epidemiological investigations and investigations.

All relevant departments shall, in accordance with the division of responsibilities, work together to prevent and control the African swine fever.

4.2.3 Large (Level III) epidemic response

The Ministry of Agriculture issued a Class III outbreak warning to the society. The veterinary department of the relevant port and port area coordinated the entry-exit inspection and quarantine department to immediately launch the African swine fever prevention and control working day daily reporting system, carry out emergency epidemiological investigation and investigation, and suspend the transfer of pigs and related products from the relevant ports.

All relevant departments shall, in accordance with the division of responsibilities, work together to prevent and control the African swine fever.

4.3 Termination of emergency response

After the African swine fever epidemic situation is effectively controlled, the corresponding veterinary authorities will evaluate the epidemic situation and propose a proposal to terminate the emergency response, which will be announced in accordance with the procedures.

5 Emergency treatment

5.1 Emergency treatment of suspected outbreaks

The animals in the disease affected farms are strictly isolated and monitored, and the diseased affected farms and the farms with epidemiological associations are sampled and tested.

It is forbidden to move susceptible animals and their products, feed and litter, waste and other related items, and strictly disinfect their internal and external environment. When necessary, take measures such as blockade and culling.

5.2 Emergency treatment of confirmed outbreaks

After the diagnosis of the epidemic, the competent department of veterinary at or above the county level shall immediately delineate the epidemic point, the epidemic area and the threatened area, investigate the epidemic source, and propose to the people's government at the same level to initiate an emergency response, and the local people's government shall make a decision according to law.

5.2.1 Delineation of epidemic sites, epidemic areas and threatened areas

Epidemic site: The location where the affected pig is located. Relatively independent large-scale farms (households), with the farm (household) where the sick pigs are located. For the free-range pigs, the natural village where the sick pigs located as the epidemic site .In the event of an outbreak in the course of transportation, the vehicle, the ship, the aircraft and other means of transport carrying the sick pig shall be the epidemic site; if the epidemic occurs in the market, the market where the sick pig is located shall be the epidemic site; if an epidemic occurs during the slaughtering and processing, Take the slaughtering and processing plant (field) as the epidemic site.

Epidemic area: An area extending 3 km from the edge of the epidemic site.

Threatened area: An area extending 10 km from the edge of the epidemic area. For areas with wild boar activity, the threatened area should be an area extending 50 km from the edge of the epidemic area.

When delineating epidemic sites, epidemic areas and threatened areas, comprehensive assessment should be based on local natural barriers (such as rivers, mountains, etc.), artificial barriers (roads, fences, etc.), distribution of wild boars, and retrospective investigation and risk analysis results..

5.2.2 Blockade

The competent veterinary department at or above the county level where the epidemic occurred is reported to the people's government at the same level to impose a blockade on the epidemic area, and the local people's government shall issue a blockade order according to law.

When an epidemic occurs across administrative areas, the upper-level people's government jointly controlled by the relevant administrative regions shall impose a blockade on the infected areas, or the upper-level people's governments of the relevant administrative areas shall jointly block the infected areas. When necessary, the people's government at a higher level may instruct the people's government at a lower level to impose a blockade on the epidemic area.

5.2.3 Measures to be taken in the epidemic site

The county-level people's government where the epidemic occurred is arbitrarily organized to cull and destroy all pigs in the epidemic site, and to treat all dead pigs, culled pigs and their products harmlessly. Indiscriminate treatment of excreta, meal waste, contaminated or potentially contaminated feed and litter, sewage, etc. Strict and thorough disinfection of contaminated or potentially contaminated items, vehicles, utensils, pig houses and sites. Access personnel, vehicles and related facilities should be disinfected as required. It is forbidden to import and release susceptible animals and related products.

5.2.4 Measures to be taken in the epidemic area

The veterinary department of the people's government at or above the county level where the epidemic occurs shall, in accordance with procedures and requirements, set up warning signs around the epidemic area, set up temporary disinfection stations at the traffic intersections entering and leaving the epidemic

areas, perform supervision and inspection tasks, and conduct personnel and vehicles for entry and exit disinfection. It is forbidden to import and release susceptible animals and related products. Close the hog trading market and the slaughterhouse. Strictly disinfect the pig farms (households) and other places, and do a good job in sampling and epidemiological investigations, and determine the scope of culling based on the results of the tests and investigations.

5.2.5 Measures to be taken in the threatened area

It is forbidden to import and release susceptible animals and related products. Close the hog trading market. The county-level people's government where the epidemic occurred is organizing timely comprehensive clinical surveillance of the pig farms (households) and slaughterhouses, timely grasping the epidemic situation and strengthening prevention and control measures.

5.3 Wildlife and insect control

The local veterinary departments coordinate the forestry department to investigate and monitor the distribution of wild boar in infected areas, threatened areas and surrounding areas. Farmers should take measures to avoid contact between domestic pigs and wild pigs. In the area where the soft ticks are distributed, the pig farms (households) in the epidemic areas, epidemic areas, and threatened areas should take control measures to kill soft ticks, and the veterinary department should strengthen testing and risk assessment. The local veterinary department and the forestry department should regularly inform each other about the information.

5.4 Epidemic tracking and traceability

Conducting follow-up investigations on the whereabouts of susceptible animals, related products, transport vehicles and close contacts who are exported from the epidemic site within 30 days before the outbreak and after the epidemic has occurred. Sampling and testing the farms with epidemiological associations and analysis and assessment of the risk of spread of the epidemic.

Within 30 days before the outbreak, trace all the susceptible animals, related products and means of transport introduced to the epidemic site for traceability investigation. Sampling and testing the farms with epidemiological associations to analyze the source of the epidemic.

5.5 Unblocking

After all infected pigs in the epidemic site and epidemic area were dead or culled and harmlessly treated according to the regulations for 6 weeks and after the inspection and acceptance by the superior veterinary department in the place where the epidemic occurred. The veterinary authorities at or above the county level where the epidemic occurred apply to the people's government that originally issued the blockade order to lift the blockade, and the people's government issues an order to release the blockade and notify the neighboring areas and relevant departments. After the blockade is lifted, the epidemic site and the epidemic area should be emptied for at least 6 months.

5.6 culling subsidy

For animals that are forced to cull during the control and suppression of African swine fever, and the destroyed animal products, compensation shall be made in accordance with the relevant provisions on the culling of major animal diseases.

6 Safeguards

6.1 Organizational leadership

According to the relevant documents of the State Council, local people's governments at various levels have overall responsibility for the prevention and control of African swine fever in their jurisdiction. The local veterinary authorities shall promptly report to the local people's governments at or above the county level, and formulate an implementation plan for the emergency plan for African swine fever in the region in light of the actual situation. Under the unified leadership of the local people's government, local veterinary departments have strengthened cooperation with relevant departments, timely notified the situation and progress of the epidemic, timely adjusted and improved prevention and control strategies and measures, and jointly carried out emergency treatment of African swine fever.

6.2 Legal protection

It is necessary to strictly follow the "Law of the People's Republic of China Animal Epidemic Prevention Law", "People's Republic of China Entry and Exit Animal and Plant Quarantine Law" and other relevant laws and regulations and this precaution to carry out prevention and control work, and implement the responsibility system for prevention and control. Those who fail to perform their duties and influence the prevention and control of the epidemic shall be investigated for the responsibility of the parties concerned.

6.3 Conditional guarantee

The veterinary authorities at all levels shall report to the local people's government for the funding guarantee and material supply for the emergency materials reserve. It is necessary to actively coordinate the financial and other departments to incorporate prevention and control funds such as epidemic monitoring, epidemic disease diagnosis, epidemiological investigation, culling, harmless treatment, disinfection, insecticide and source protection and personnel protection into the financial budgets at all levels. The funds required for culling subsidies are shared by the central and local governments in a prescribed proportion.

6.4 Technical support

The China Animal Health and Epidemiology Center or other African swine fever laboratory designated by the Ministry of Agriculture shall strengthen research on prevention and control technology and related diagnostic reagents, do a good job in technical reserve work, and strengthen laboratory monitoring technical guidance for high-risk areas such as border provinces. . Laboratories carrying out

research on the pathogens of African swine fever must reach a level 3 biosafety level and obtain permission to carry out relevant experimental activities as required. The China Center for Animal Health and Epidemiology should strengthen technical training and support for provincial, city and county veterinary laboratories.

6.5 Import trade and entry quarantine

The General Administration of Quality Supervision, Inspection and Quarantine and the Ministry of Agriculture issued a timely announcement to suspend the import trade of pigs, wild boars and related products in countries and regions where the epidemic has occurred. Strengthen departmental coordination, coordinate with relevant departments to do quarantine work at highway ports, railway ports and ports (airports, seaports), and harmless disposal of wastes such as international flights and ships.

6.6 Publicity and education

All localities should strengthen team building, regularly organize prevention and control technology training, and focus on strengthening related training such as case discovery, identification, reporting, monitoring, disinfection and harmless treatment. Strengthen anti-epidemic propaganda, popularize African swine fever prevention and control and emergency disposal knowledge through various media, mobilize social forces to implement various prevention and control measures, and maintain normal production and living order.

6.7 International exchange and cooperation

Strengthen foreign technical exchanges and cooperation, strive for international support, and reduce the impact of the epidemic on China's economy, trade and tourism.

7 Supplementary

7.1 This plan is explained by the Ministry of Agriculture.

7.2 This plan is effective as of the date of promulgation. (September 20, 2017)